> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.ducatprotocol.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.ducatprotocol.com/trust-assumptions/overview.md).

# Overview

Ducat settles BTC and Rune transactions on Bitcoin and interprets vaults and active UNIT through a metaprotocol. Its security depends on the interaction between Bitcoin spending conditions, guardian authorisation, oracle commitments and independent validation.

### Responsibilities and limits

| Component           | Responsibility                                                               | Limit                                                                                     |
| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Bitcoin             | Enforces transaction validity, signatures, hashlocks and the accepted chain. | Does not evaluate BTC/USD prices, collateral ratios or the UNIT peg.                      |
| Vault owner         | Authorises cooperative vault actions with their key.                         | Cannot independently spend the documented cooperative vault without a guardian signature. |
| Guardian group      | Validates proposed actions and supplies its signing authority.               | Availability and correct signing depend on the configured threshold participants.         |
| Oracle              | Authenticates observations and controls threshold-key release.               | A signature does not prove market truth or timely, honest release.                        |
| Ducat validator     | Reconstructs state, active UNIT accounting and validation diagnostics.       | Cannot reverse Bitcoin transactions or recover spent collateral.                          |
| Market participants | Supply liquidation capital and UNIT liquidity.                               | Participation and execution prices are not guaranteed.                                    |

Guardians are not Bitcoin miners, and a Ducat validator is not a replacement for Bitcoin consensus. These roles enforce different conditions.

### Safety and availability

For cooperative actions, the user and a guardian group must sign. For a liquidation path, a guardian group and a matching oracle preimage are sufficient; the borrower's signature is not required.

A threshold signing arrangement distributes the guardian key's authority. Its resilience depends on the actual threshold, operator independence, key handling and availability. The use of FROST alone does not prove those operational properties.

Oracle and guardian separation provides distinct checks, but it does not make collusion or correlated failure impossible.

### Verification and recovery

Running an independent validator reduces reliance on a hosted service's account of balances and vault state. Consumers must still use the correct Bitcoin chain, anchor, software and historical context, and inspect relevant policy diagnostics.

A validator can reject a malformed Ducat action while still observing the Bitcoin spend and Rune allocations. Confirmed replay can also preserve an observed transition with economic-policy diagnostics. Neither outcome restores spent BTC.

A new deployment can select new keys and rules, but it cannot automatically move collateral locked under old keys. Recovery depends on the spending paths that actually exist, available signers and any valid migration transaction.

See [Asset Management](/trust-assumptions/asset-management.md), [Supply Control](/trust-assumptions/supply-control.md) and [Liquidations](/trust-assumptions/liquidations.md) for the specific assumptions.
